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AFTER EU MEMBERSHIP: THE UNITED KINGDOM IN TRANSITION 
Kenneth A Armstrong
One of the fundamental risks of a 'No Deal' Brexit would be the loss of a transition 
period between the United Kingdom's (UK) departure from the European Union 
(EU) and the entry into force of subsequent agreements establishing the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU. The idea of a transitional period of legal and 
economic continuity and certainty was suggested by the UK Government at the outset 
of the Article 50 TEU negotiations and accepted (with qualifications) by the EU. 
However, the early consensus around creating a 'safety net' against the parties falling 
over the cliff-edge of a disorderly departure and a 'bridge' to a future relationship 
changed after the negotiations were concluded. For those opposed to the negotiated 
Withdrawal Agreement, the transition period – like the Irish 'backstop' – seemed more 
like a 'trap' or a 'trampoline' to maintain alignment with the EU post-Brexit. The 
first aim of this article is to analyse what the UK and the EU sought to achieve in the 
negotiations by agreeing a transition period. The second aim is to consider whether – 
in combination with other factors – the outcome of the negotiations on a transition 
period contributed to the failure of the UK to exit the EU as intended on 29 March 
2019. The article concludes that the Article 50 negotiation process underestimates the 
way in which the momentous nature of a decision to leave the EU unleashes political 
forces that inhibit a smooth and orderly exit and transition. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Kingdom (UK) was scheduled to end its membership of the 
European Union (EU) on the 29th March 2019. Had things gone to plan, the 
EU and the UK would subsequently have entered into a 'transition period' 
operational immediately upon the UK's exit from the Union. Recognising 
that a future relationship between the Union and the UK would only be 
negotiated and agreed once the UK had formally left the Union,1 the 
intention behind the transition period was to offer certainty and stability to 
the legal relations between the parties, and between the economic and social 
actors located in their respective territories. The EU rules and norms 
applicable during the transition period – and the legal discipline they exert – 
would produce a form of 'shadow membership' substituting for the past legal 
discipline of EU membership and for alternative default rules, including the 
discipline of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements.2  
The UK's departure from the Union – and the commencement of the 
transition period – did not proceed as intended. The UK Government failed 
to secure parliamentary approval for the texts of the Withdrawal Agreement 
and Political Declaration negotiated and agreed between the Union and the 
UK, despite two formal approval votes, and one vote simply on the text of the 
 
1 See Sacerdoti and Mariani in this issue. 
2 Kenneth A Armstrong, 'Regulatory Alignment and Divergence After Brexit' (2018) 
25 Journal of European Public Policy 1099. 
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Withdrawal Agreement.3 This led the UK Prime Minister to write on two 
occasions to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk to request 
an extension to the period provided for in Article 50 TEU, and to delay 
'Brexit' till 31 October 2019.4 It also resulted in the resignation of Theresa 
May as leader of her party and as Prime Minister, throwing more political 
uncertainty into the divisive politics of Brexit.5 On 24 July 2019, Boris 
Johnson became the new British Prime Minister, vowing that the UK would 
leave the European Union by 31 October 2019, 'no ifs no buts'.6 Failure to 
secure a revised agreement with the EU by this deadline would see the UK 
leaving the Union without a deal and without a transition period. 
This article pursues two central aims. The first is to comprehend how the EU 
and the UK understood the role to be played by a transition period in the 
wider withdrawal process. Through an analysis of the negotiations and the 
text of what became the provisions on transition within the Withdrawal 
Agreement, the article pinpoints key ambiguities about the purposes of 
transition and the management of the Brexit process. Metaphorically, a 
transition period could be understood as a kind of 'safety net' to prevent the 
UK simply falling over the 'cliff-edge' once the treaties ceased to apply to the 
UK as a Member State of the Union. But it could also act as a 'bridge' to a 
future relationship with the EU, thereby offering a high level of continuity in 
 
3 The term 'formal approval vote' is used here to indicate a vote in terms of Section 
13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 which requires Parliament to 
approve the texts of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration 
prior to its ratification and entry into force. The votes were held on 15 January 2019 
and 12 March 2019. The texts of the Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration are published at [2019] OJ C66 I. For further discussion see Jones in 
this issue. 
4 See further below and in more detail in Fabbrini and Schmidt in this issue. 
5 For a preliminary analyse of the impact of Brexit on the 'Westminster model' of 
decision-making see: Gianfranco Baldini, Edoardo Bressanelli and Emanuele 
Massetti, 'Who Is in Control? Brexit and The Westminster Model' (2018) 89 The 
Political Quarterly 537. For Brexit's wider political implications see: Andrew 
Gamble, 'Taking Back Control: The Political Implications of Brexit' (2018) 25 
Journal of European Public Policy 1215. 
6 'Boris Johnson's first speech as Prime Minister' (GOV.UK, 24 July 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/boris-johnsons-first-speech-as-prime-
minister-24-july-2019> accessed 11 October 2019. 
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legal and economic relations between the parties as a precursor to the 
negotiation and conclusion of a long-term relationship. As against these 
benign depictions, the concept of a transition period could also be viewed 
with suspicion. The creation of a short-term 'shadow membership' might be 
considered as less of safety net and more as a 'trap' by keeping the UK closely 
aligned to EU rules and regulations notwithstanding the UK's departure 
from the Union. When taken together with the provisions relating to the so-
called Irish 'backstop', the safety net of a transition period might also act as a 
'trampoline' bouncing the UK into a future relationship with the Union 
based on regulatory alignment with the EU.  
The second aim of this article is to follow the common thread which runs 
through all the contributions to this special issue, namely to understand the 
interaction of law and politics throughout the Article 50 withdrawal 
negotiations. More specifically in the context of this article, the intention is 
to reflect upon whether the pursuit of a transition period contributed to the 
failure of the negotiations to produce an agreement that could obtain the 
domestic approval of the UK House of Commons. Although much of the 
political attention understandably has focused on the contentious nature of 
the Irish 'backstop', arguably some of the same anxieties about regulatory 
alignment and democratic control were present in discussions about a 
transition period. 
The article expands on these research aims beginning in Section 2 with an 
unpacking of the different purposes that transition might serve. Given the 
problems experienced in delivering Brexit, it is clear that one of the central 
purposes of transition – to ensure stability and certainty to allow affected 
interests to plan for a time after EU membership – has effectively been lost. 
Rather than being able to organise on the basis of the rules and norms 
applicable during a transition period, 'No Deal' contingencies have had to be 
put in place including the hasty promulgation of more than five hundred 
statutory instruments.7 Under the premiership of Boris Johnson, No Deal 
contingency planning intensified. Without it being clear which set of rules 
and norms would apply – the body of EU law applicable during a defined 
transition period or a body of amended 'retained EU law' applicable for an 
 
7 See 'EU Withdrawal Act 2018 statutory instruments' <https://www.gov.uk/eu-
withdrawal-act-2018-statutory-instruments> accessed 11 October 2019. 
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unknown period of time – economic undertakings have made contingency 
plans based on worst case scenarios.8 
Section 3 focuses on the outcome of the Article 50 negotiations in respect of 
the scope and legal effect of a 'standstill' transition period created by the 
Withdrawal Agreement. While the analysis is focused on giving continuing 
effect to 'internal' Union law during a period of transition, the analysis also 
draws attention to the 'external' dimension of Union law, including 
implications for the European Economic Area Agreement. The evident 
intention of the parties was to maximise legal certainty through continuity in 
legal relations between the UK and the EU (and beyond). Yet this aspiration 
for legal certainty can be seen to be in tension with a domestic politics fearful 
of being trapped in regulatory alignment with the EU without democratic 
representation in the institutions of the EU. 
Section 4 examines the different terminology deployed by the EU and the 
UK during the negotiations to describe an interim legal framework following 
withdrawal. It discloses contrasting assumptions about the phasing of the 
negotiations and the function of transition. Paradoxically, the UK's failure to 
build a domestic consensus on where negotiations on a future relationship 
might lead both made the need for a transition period more urgent but also 
contributed to the failure to attain approval for a Withdrawal Agreement 
which would create such a transitional legal framework. 
The competence to create a transition period, and the legal and political 
considerations which shaped the construction of that period are analysed in 
Section 5. In particular, the temporal limitations on transition illustrate the 
way in which time shapes Brexit.9 Significantly, the need for transition to be 
time-limited heightens the politics surrounding the so-called Irish 'backstop' 
that would come into effect at the end of a transition period if neither 
alternative arrangements nor a subsequent trade and cooperation agreement 
 
8 'Retained EU law' refers to domesticated EU law applicable as of 'exit day' in terms 
of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. In a 'No Deal' scenario this body 
of law comes into legal effect with any consequential amendments made by 
statutory instruments to correct any 'deficiencies' (section 8 of the Act).  
9 Kenneth A Armstrong, Brexit Time - Leaving The EU: Why, How and When? 
(Cambridge University Press 2017). 
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between the EU and the UK was in force. The controversy around the 
backstop contributes to the problems in bringing transition into effect. 
Sections 6 and 7 continue the temporal theme analysing, respectively, the 
intended duration of the transition period and the implications of extending 
the Article 50 period in curtailing the duration of transition. As will become 
clear, the more the UK's membership of the EU is extended, the more 
doubtful it becomes that transition can serve a useful purpose.  
The article concludes that it is entirely possible that if the UK leaves the EU 
on 31 October as promised by the new UK Prime Minister, it will do so 
without a transition period coming into effect and with no Withdrawal 
Agreement in force. While the negotiators of the Withdrawal Agreement 
may have thought that they were creating a vehicle for economic stability and 
legal certainty in a post-membership period, they underestimated just how 
much domestic politics – and the UK itself – is in transition following the 
2016 referendum. 
II. THE PURPOSES OF TRANSITION 
In her letter notifying the President of the European Council of the United 
Kingdom's intention to withdraw from the Union, Prime Minister May set 
out a key purpose of transition:10 
Investors, businesses and citizens in both the UK and across the remaining 
27 member states – and those from third countries around the world – want 
to be able to plan. In order to avoid any cliff-edge as we move from our 
current relationship to our future partnership, people and businesses in both 
the UK and the EU would benefit from implementation periods to adjust in 
a smooth and orderly way to new arrangements. 
In evidence before the House of Commons Select Committee on Exiting the 
EU on 25th October 2017, the then Secretary of State for Exiting the EU 
 
10 'Prime Minister's letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50' (GOV.UK, 29 March 
2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-
donald-tusk-triggering-article-50> accessed 11 October 2019.  
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David Davis identified three main reasons for seeking an 'implementation 
period':11 
 To give business clarity about what they might need to do to prepare 
for the UK's withdrawal rather than simply having to prepare for a 
worst-case scenario;  
 To give the UK government more time to put in place arrangements 
for life outside the EU; and 
 To give other EU states time to make any consequential adjustments. 
The first rationale clearly chimes with the sentiment behind the Prime 
Minister's Article 50 notification. At its simplest it is the idea that the UK 
should not fall off a 'cliff-edge' after the expiry of the two-year period laid 
down in Article 50 TEU for the negotiation of a withdrawal agreement, with 
a negotiated transition period acting as a kind of 'safety net'. There is, 
however, an important variant of this rationale which also considers the 
number of adjustments that businesses, people and states should make as the 
UK leaves the Union. The purpose of transition could also be to act as a 
'bridge' to the future, giving economic, social and political actors a 
predictable adjustment path along different vectors depending on what the 
EU and the UK were to agree. The creation of a legal 'standstill' transition 
based on the continuing application of EU law to the UK for a defined period 
of time (as explained in Section 3 below) is certainly intended to serve the 
purpose of affording legal certainty and predictability in the period between 
withdrawal and the entry into force of any subsequent agreement on the 
future relationship. 
Brexit represents a significant shock to the UK administrative system. The 
second rationale for transition recognises that after decades of shared 
administrative capacity with the EU and with other EU states, Brexit 
requires the expansion of UK domestic administrative and regulatory 
capacity as responsibilities are 'on-shored' – e.g. state aid control – while in 
other fields capacity might be reduced as regulatory responsibilities move 
away from successful UK regulators – e.g. the Medicines and Healthcare 
 
11 House of Commons Exiting the European Union Select Committee, 'The progress 
of the UK's negotiations on EU withdrawal', (2017-19), second report, HC 372. 
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products Regulatory Agency ('MHRA') – to the regulatory authorities of EU 
Member States. A transition period would facilitate this process of 
adjustment.  
However, it is not just the United Kingdom that is in transition. Brexit 
produces externalities for other EU states – 'Brexternalities'.12 For example, 
the national authorities of the EU27 need to put in place and have 
administrative capacity to manage registrations from UK citizens seeking to 
reside in their territories after Brexit.13 These Brexternalities are different 
from unintended consequences because they are foreseeable and predicable. 
Certain Brexternalities are highly visible and political – the creation of an EU 
external frontier on the island of Ireland and its effects on North-South 
relations – while others are opaque and relatively depoliticised – the transfer 
of registrations of licences and authorisations from UK competent 
authorities in areas like pharmaceuticals and financial services to the 
regulators of the EU27. Therefore, a third rationale for a transition period is 
to smooth this process of adjustment for other countries as part of an Article 
50 process intended to manage the externalities of a Member State's 
withdrawal. 
Omitted from Davis' list are three other purposes for a transition period. 
Most obviously, one of the central functions of a transition period is to give 
the Union and the UK time to negotiate a new future relationship. True, the 
UK could negotiate a trade arrangement with the Union without a transition 
period and for some, politically, it would be preferable to do so rather than 
spending time in a transition period during which the UK would continue to 
be bound by EU rules. Indeed, this seems to be the philosophy and strategy 
of the Johnson Government. Nonetheless, opening up trade negotiations 
following a disorderly departure from the Union is also highly problematic. 
A further purpose of transition is to allow the UK to manage its external 
relationships beyond the EU in ways that mirror the purposes of transition 
 
12 Kenneth A Armstrong, '"Brexternalities", Article 50 and The UK's Grossly 
Irresponsible Attempt to Export Its Own Problems' Prospect Magazine (28 June 
2019) <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/brexternalities-article-50-and-
the-uks-grossly-irresponsible-attempt-to-export-its-own-problems> accessed 11 
October 2019. 
13 See Barnard in this issue. 
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between the UK and the EU, namely to maintain on an interim basis certain 
legal relationships on existing terms and to facilitate the negotiation of new 
international agreements. With the consent of those countries, a transition 
period facilitates the continuity of legal obligations and enhances legal 
certainty rather than a disorderly and complex disentangling of them at the 
moment of withdrawal from the Union. 
The final function of a transition period is to avoid customs and regulatory 
checks on the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland at the moment 
that the treaties cease to apply to the UK.14 The transition period would 
create a default set of rules post-membership to govern economic relations 
between the Union and the UK to meet the commitments made by the UK 
and the EU to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland. However, having 
created this interim framework, the issue would always be what would 
happen once the transition period expired. In terms of the Joint Report 
agreed between the EU and the UK negotiators in December 2017,15 in the 
absence of agreed alternative arrangements to avoid a hard border on the 
island of Ireland, post-transition, the UK would commit to maintaining full 
alignment with the rules of the customs union and the internal market for the 
purposes of maintaining North-South cooperation, the all-Ireland economy 
and the protection of the 1998 Belfast 'Good Friday' Agreement (the so-
called 'backstop').16 The precise extent of that alignment was later agreed in 
a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland attached to the Withdrawal 
Agreement (the 'Irish Protocol'). However, a major stumbling block in 
gaining parliamentary approval for the negotiated Withdrawal Agreement 
was a fear that a transition period and the backstop were devices to trap the 
UK in continuing regulatory alignment with the EU rather than temporary 
adjustment mechanisms. Looking longer term, both the transition period 
 
14 See further Connolly and Doyle in this issue. 
15 'Joint Report from the Negotiators of the European Union and the United 
Kingdom Government on progress during phase one of negotiations under Article 
50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the European Union – 
TF50' (GOV.UK, 2017) 19 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-
report-on-progress-during-phase-1-of-negotiations-under-article-50-teu-on-the-
uks-orderly-withdrawal-from-the-eu> accessed 11 October 2019.  
16 Ibid. paras 49-50. For detailed analysis of the backstop see Connolly and Doyle in 
this issue. 
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and the backstop could also be understood as serving the purpose of bouncing 
the UK into a future relationship of close regulatory alignment with the EU. 
By unpacking these different understandings of the purposes of transition it 
becomes evident that the different metaphors of 'safety net', 'bridge', 'trap' 
and 'trampoline' highlight a deep tension between the uncertain and 
contested politics of Brexit, and the aspiration for legal certainty and 
continuity of economic and social relations post-membership. 
III. THE SCOPE AND LEGAL EFFECTS OF A TRANSITION PERIOD 
In this section the analysis focuses on how the concept of a transition period 
was turned into legal text during the negotiations. In the December 2017 
Joint Report on the progress of the negotiations, the UK signalled its desire 
that there be 'an agreement as early as possible in 2018 on transitional 
arrangements'.17 A developed version of the transition period was already in 
place in the February 2018 draft text of the Withdrawal Agreement.18 This 
was further refined during the negotiations to produce the text contained in 
the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) but the principle of a 'standstill' transition 
based on the continuing application of Union law to the UK for a defined 
period post-membership remained unchanged from the February draft. 
The scope of application of the transition period is established in Article 127 
WA. According to this provision, 'Union law' shall remain applicable to the 
UK during the transition period. 'Union law' is defined in Article 2 WA as: 
 the Treaty on European Union ('TEU'), the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') and the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ('Euratom 
Treaty'), as amended or supplemented, as well as the Treaties of 
Accession and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, together referred to as 'the Treaties'; 
 the general principles of the Union's law; 
 
17 Above n 15, para 96. 
18 European Commission, Draft Withdrawal Agreement – TF (2018) 33 (28 February 
2018) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_with 
drawal_agreement.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019.  
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 the acts adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union; 
 the international agreements to which the Union is party and the 
international agreements concluded by the Member States acting on 
behalf of the Union; 
 the agreements between Member States entered into in their capacity 
as Member States of the Union; 
 acts of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the European Council or the Council of the European 
Union ('Council'). 
The following analysis is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section 
deals with the scope of application and effects of 'internal' primary and 
secondary Union law adopted before and after the UK's withdrawal from the 
Union. The second sub-section focuses on 'external' Union law in the form 
of international agreements, with specific attention being given to the 
continuing application of the European Economic Area Agreement during 
the transition period. 
1. Creating a Legal 'Stand-Still' – the Continuing Application of Union Internal 
Law 
With the exception of provisions of Union law that were not binding on the 
UK during its membership – e.g. relevant provisions on Schengen and the 
area of freedom, security and justice; enhanced cooperation measures such as 
the law applicable on divorce – or which would be inappropriate post-
membership – the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on 
'Citizenship of the Union' – primary and secondary EU law would continue 
to apply to the UK during the transition period as if the UK were a Member 
State. As made clear in Article 6 WA, the definition of 'Union law' includes, 
unless otherwise provided by the Agreement, Union law – including as 
amended or replaced – 'as applicable on the last day of the transition period'. 
Therefore, instruments adopted after withdrawal would also be applicable to 
the United Kingdom.  
The significance of Article 6 WA becomes clearer when read in conjunction 
with Article 7 WA. While the UK would remain a Member State for the 
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purposes of the continued application of Union law, under Article 7 WA it 
loses its representation in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union. Article 128 WA makes clear that Article 7 WA applies to the 
transition period. In other words, the UK could not participate in the 
decision-making structures that would promulgate new rules during the 
transition period. In terms of the administration and implementation of 
Union law, although Article 7 WA excludes the UK from participating in the 
work of expert committees following its withdrawal, Article 128(5) WA 
derogates from Article 7 WA during the transition period, by allowing its 
participation at the invitation of the Union where the discussions of expert 
groups and committees concerns acts addressed to natural or legal persons 
residing or established in the UK or where the presence of the UK is 
necessary and in the interests of the Union for the effective implementation 
of Union law. However, and of some significance, UK regulatory authorities 
like the MHRA will not be able to act as a 'leading authority' carrying out risk 
assessments whether on behalf of the European Medicines Agency for the 
purposes of the centralised authorisation of medicines, or at the level of the 
Member States for the purposes of decentralised authorisation of medicines 
(see Article 128(6) WA). This is a crucial and significant departure from the 
'standstill' approach with the effect that the MHRA loses an important part 
of its regulatory business and the fee income associated with it. 
The body of law applicable to the UK during transition is not, however, 
reducible to the instruments that make up the Union acquis. These 
instruments are embedded within a legal order that not only claims its 
autonomy from national law but also imposes its own demands in terms of 
the effects which this body of law can produce within the domestic legal 
order. In their interactions with this legal order, the legal systems of the 
Member States, including the United Kingdom, have accepted and mediated 
the legal discipline deriving from EU law in different ways.19 Nonetheless, it 
is a feature of the primacy principle that it derives from EU law as an 
'independent source of law', while the capacity of this body of law to be 
domestically enforced in national courts through 'direct effect' applies 
 
19 Bruno De Witte, 'Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order' in 
Paul Craig and Graínne De Búrca (ed), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University 
Press 2011). 
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'independently of the legislation of the Member States'.20 The Withdrawal 
Agreement seeks to ensure that whatever the UK does in domestic legal 
terms, the qualities of primacy and direct effect – as they apply to the 
Agreement and the law it makes applicable to the UK – continue to derive 
from EU law. 
In specifying the 'methods and principles' relating to the effect, 
implementation and application of the Agreement, Article 4(1) WA states a 
general proposition: 
The provisions of this Agreement and the provisions of Union law made 
applicable by this Agreement shall produce in respect of and in the United 
Kingdom the same legal effects as those which they produce within the 
Union and its Member States. 
The reference to 'provisions of Union law made applicable by this 
Agreement' would clearly apply to Union law during the transition period and 
indeed Article 127 WA makes this absolutely explicit. Importantly, Article 4 
WA goes on to state in express terms that natural or legal persons may rely 
on the direct effect of provisions of the Agreement itself as well as those 
referred to in the Agreement, provided those provisions meet the normal 
justiciability requirements for direct effect. Article 4(2) requires the UK to 
ensure compliance with Article 4(1) WA through domestic primary 
legislation to allow judicial and administrative institutions 'to disapply 
inconsistent or incompatible domestic provisions'. In this way, the legal – 
indeed 'constitutional' – discipline produced by primacy and direct effect are 
to be extended during the transition period to the Union's relationship with 
a post-membership United Kingdom. 
Nonetheless, in a dualist system like the UK there still needs to be a 
mechanism in national law to allow the Withdrawal Agreement and the law 
made applicable by it to be deployed domestically.21 During its membership, 
the function of the European Communities Act 1972 was to recognise and 
give effect to EU law as a source of law available within the domestic legal 
order. It would have been an option for the UK to retain the 1972 Act and add 
 
20 Respectively Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, EU:C:1964:66 and Van Gend en Loos, Case 
26/62, EU:C:1963:1. 
21 Paul Craig, 'Constitutional Principle, The Rule of Law and Political Reality: The 
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018' (2019) 82 The Modern Law Review 319. 
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the Withdrawal Agreement to the list of instruments to which it gave effect. 
That would have given continuity post-Brexit not just to the instruments of 
the Union acquis during transition, but also afforded confidence to the Union 
in terms of the domestic application and enforcement of this body of law. 
Politically, however, the repeal of the 1972 Act would be a clear signal that the 
UK was withdrawing from the Union. Therefore, the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 repeals the 1972 Act when its relevant provisions are 
commenced. It would be the function of a European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Bill to ensure that the demands of Article 4 WA and Article 127 
WA could be met in domestic law. Yet, the failure by Parliament to approve 
the text of the Withdrawal Agreement meant that the Bill remained 
unpublished let alone enacted by the time that Theresa May stood down as 
Prime Minster. 
2. International Agreements and the European Economic Area Agreement 
The Withdrawal Agreement states that international agreements shall 
continue to apply during transition as if the UK were still a Member State and 
still bound by these agreements. This reflects the UK's own wish to avoid 
disruption in its, and the Union's legal relationships with third countries.22 
However, the consent of third countries is required in order to maintain the 
desired legal effects and in a footnote to Article 129 WA, the Union indicates 
that it will notify the other parties to international agreements that the UK 
is to be treated as a Member State for the purposes of the agreements during 
the transition period. The Union will also notify them if there is an extension 
to the transition period pursuant to Article 132.  
However, the issue for third countries and for the UK itself is whether 
temporary continuity during transition should simply rollover and produce 
agreements replicating the terms of existing agreements once transition ends 
or whether the transition period offers time and the opportunity to negotiate 
new and different terms.23 After all, pursuit of 'an independent trade policy' 
was identified by the UK Government in its 'Chequer's Plan' as delivering on 
 
22 HM Government, 'Technical Note: International Agreements During the 
Implementation Period' (February 2018). 
23 House of Commons Library, 'UK replacement of the EU's external agreements 
after Brexit', Briefing Paper No. 8370 (23 May 2019). 
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the result of the 2016 referendum.24 It also resonated with an aspiration to 
forge a post-Brexit identity for the UK as 'Global Britain', intended to 
project an image of the UK as a confident outward-looking actor on the world 
stage.25 Be that as it may, the uncertainty over whether the UK would approve 
a Withdrawal Agreement or leave the EU without a deal prompted the UK 
to announce a set of temporary tariffs and tariff-free access to UK markets 
without demands for reciprocity.26 This undermined negotiations on rolling 
over the EU-negotiated trade deals like the Canada-EU Trade Agreement 
given that on the basis of the 'No Deal' arrangements, Canadian exporters 
would benefit from tariff-free access in many areas and yet Canada could 
impose tariffs on UK imports on products.27 This unilateral step by the UK 
frustrated the intention behind the transitional framework of providing a 
smooth adjustment path that could – if the UK and its international partners 
were so minded – produce reciprocal trade liberalisation agreements in a 
post-transition period. At its simplest, the lack of clarity as to whether there 
would or would not be a transition period, and whether there would or would 
not be temporary No Deal rules, meant that non-EU partners like Canada 
found themselves unable to agree terms to rollover the trade agreements they 
had concluded with the EU. 
In respect of the UK's ability to negotiate new agreements with non-Member 
States during the transition period, Article 129 WA states: 
… during the transition period, the United Kingdom may negotiate, sign and 
ratify international agreements entered into in its own capacity in the areas 
 
24 HM Government, 'The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union', Cm 9593. 
25 As a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Report notes, the term 
'Global Britain' has been deployed frequently as a means of articulating the UK's 
external identity post-EU membership but without specificity as to what this 
entails: Foreign Affairs Committee, 'Global Britain', 6th Report (2017-19), HC 780. 
26 Department for International Trade, 'MFN and tariff-rate quotas of customs duty 
on imports if the UK leaves the EU with no deal' (GOV.UK, 29 March 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/temporary-rates-of-customs-duty-
on-imports-after-eu-exit/mfn-and-tariff-quota-rates-of-customs-duty-on-
imports-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-with-no-deal> accessed 11 October 2019.  
27 'Canadian businesses need more than optimism from Boris Johnson' (CBC News, 
24 July 2019) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-uk-trade-boris-
wednesday-1.5221984> accessed 11 October 2019.  
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of exclusive competence of the Union, provided those agreements do not 
enter into force or apply during the transition period, unless so authorised by 
the Union. 
The problem this might create is that third countries may be keen to 
establish a new economic relationship with the UK during the transition 
period but the Union may be reluctant to see those new trading terms applied 
before the UK finalises its future economic relationship with the EU. In this 
way – and particularly if the UK and EU extend transition because a new 
trade and economic partnership between the Union and UK is not finalised 
– the UK and third countries could find their scope to develop new 
international trade deals to be constrained during the transition period. 
It is also worth briefly noting the particular approach which has been taken 
to the European Economic Area Agreement. While there has been debate 
over whether the UK should forge a future relationship with the EU based on 
EFTA membership and the EEA Agreement, some consideration has also 
been given to using the EEA vehicle as a form of interim or transitional 
framework for the UK post-Brexit, particularly as an alternative to the 
transition period established by the Withdrawal Agreement in the event of a 
No Deal Brexit.28 Nonetheless, and on the assumption that a Withdrawal 
Agreement would enter into force, the United Kingdom negotiated an 
agreement with Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland to shadow the terms of 
the Withdrawal Agreement.29 This parallel agreement would have particular 
relevance for the protection of the rights of EEA nationals.30 It would also 
 
28 'Norway for Now – or Never?' The Economist (3 November 2018) 
<https://www.economist.com/britain/2018/11/03/norway-for-now-or-never> 
accessed 11 October 2019 . 
29 Draft Agreement on arrangements between Iceland, the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union, the EEA Agreement and other agreements applicable between 
the United Kingdom and the EEA EFTA States by virtue of the United Kingdom's 
membership of the European Union: <https://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/ 
documents/eea/eea/legal-texts/2018_12_20_UK-EEA-EFTA_separation_agree 
ment.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019.  
30 Indeed, because of fears of a No Deal Brexit, the UK and participating EFTA 
states also agreed a separate legal text covering citizens' rights: Draft Agreement 
on arrangements regarding citizens' rights between Iceland, the Principality of 
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secure the continuing application of the EEA Agreement and Union acts 
incorporated into the EEA Agreement during the transition period. 
Reflecting that the EEA Agreement does not give rise to direct effect and 
primacy in the same way as Union law,31 the parallel provision to Article 4 
WA accepts that the obligations created will be given effect within the 
domestic law of the contracting parties with their judicial and administrative 
institutions having 'due regard' to the Agreement.32  
All of this leaves open the question of the kind of relationship between the 
UK and the EFTA states to which transition might lead. The draft agreement 
anticipates a new future relationship but there is no equivalent of the 
Political Declaration to guide and so the preamble to the draft agreement 
simply considers that the parties will: 
… take all necessary steps to begin as soon as possible the formal negotiations 
of one or several agreements governing their future relationship with a view 
to ensuring that, to the extent possible, those agreements apply from the end 
of the transition period. 
In this way, transition under the draft agreement between the EFTA states 
and the UK is primarily about creating a safety net rather than a bridge. 
IV. A 'TRANSITION' OR 'IMPLEMENTATION' PERIOD 
A potent symbol of the politics of Brexit – and the way in which law interacts 
with that politics – can be found in the different legal terminologies deployed 
by the EU and the UK throughout the negotiations to refer to the interim 
period following membership and before a new relationship could begin. 
While the European Council's Guidelines on the Article 50 negotiations 
anticipated 'transitional arrangements' and the Union consistently referred 
 
Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union and the EEA Agreement: <https://www.efta.int/sites/ 
default/files/documents/eea/eea/legal-texts/EEA_EFTA-
UK_no_deal_CR_agreement.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019.  
31 Halvard H. Fredriksen and Christian N.K. Franklin, 'Of Pragmatism and 
Principles: The EEA Agreement 20 Years On' (2015) 52 Common Market Law 
Review 629. 
32 Above n 29, Article 4. 
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to a 'transition period', the UK preferred the terminology of an 
'implementation period'. This was not a mere linguistic preference but 
instead revealed a very different understanding of how the UK would end its 
membership and start a new post-membership relationship with the EU. 
For the EU, negotiations have to follow a sequential path with the phases of 
negotiations governed by distinct legal provisions in the treaties. The Article 
50 negotiations cover the settlement of the terms of withdrawal – including 
provisions on citizens' rights, the financial settlement, Northern Ireland – 
and provisions on transition, whereas any agreement on a future relationship 
is governed by alternative legal bases in the treaty depending on what sort of 
relationship the parties agreed to pursue. The UK, however, wanted to have 
parallel tracks to the negotiations in the hope that a future relationship could 
be settled during the Article 50 negotiations and then 'implemented' once 
the UK had left the EU. 
The EU's approach to the negotiations prevailed. The 'phased approach to 
negotiations' was made clear in the Guidelines given by the European 
Council for the conduct of the Article 50 negotiations on behalf of the 
Union.33 The legal text of the Withdrawal Agreement refers throughout to a 
transition period – Part Four of the Agreement is entitled 'Transition' and 
Article 126 has the heading 'Transition Period' – but as a concession to the 
UK, the substance of the text of Article 126 states that '[T]here shall be a 
transition or implementation period …'; the only other reference to an 
'implementation period' being found in the Preamble. 
However, the politics that gives rise to a Member State's withdrawal is the 
same politics that has to determine the shape of the future relationship. A 
sequenced approach to negotiations and the facility of a transition period as 
a bridge to a future relationship only really works if a political consensus on 
the future relationship is either clear at the point of the decision to withdraw 
or emerges early on in the withdrawal process. In the case of Brexit, its 
politics has proved to be highly contested. Days before the UK's scheduled 
departure from the EU on 29 March 2019, the UK Government and MPs 
were still at loggerheads over what kind of post-membership relationship the 
 
33 European Council (Art.50) guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification 
under Article 50 TEU (29 April 2017). 
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UK really wanted. A series of 'indicative votes' in the House of Commons 
failed to find a majority for any alternative to the Government's direction of 
travel as agreed with the EU and set out in the Political Declaration. 
That the debate about the future relationship took place late on in the Article 
50 process, that it did not produce a consensus, and that the framework for 
the future relationship would be contained in a 'political' declaration rather 
than a legally binding instrument did nothing to produce the political 
circumstances in which it would have been possible for the UK to leave the 
EU on 29 March 2019 and enter into a transition or implementation phase as 
intended. 
V. THE LAW AND LEGALITY OF A TRANSITION PERIOD 
The European Council guidelines on the negotiations cautiously accepted 
the legal possibility of the negotiation of a transition period under certain 
conditions: 
To the extent necessary and legally possible, the negotiations may also seek 
to determine transitional arrangements which are in the interest of the 
Union and, as appropriate, to provide for bridges towards the foreseeable 
framework for the future relationship in the light of the progress. Any such 
transitional arrangements must be clearly defined, limited in time, and 
subject to effective enforcement mechanisms. 
The text of Article 50 TEU is silent on what kind of transition is or is not 
'legally possible'. From the perspective of the attributed competence of the 
Union, Article 50 TEU has been considered by the Council as conferring on 
the Union a particularly broad legal power to manage the terms of 
withdrawal. The Article 50 'negotiating directives' agreed by the Council 
state that:34 
…Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union confers on the Union an 
exceptional horizontal competence to cover in this agreement all matters 
necessary to arrange the withdrawal. This exceptional competence is of a 
 
34 Council Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising the opening of negotiations with the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement setting 
out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union (XT 21016/17). 
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one-off nature and strictly for the purposes of arranging the withdrawal from 
the Union. 
Framed in this way, the Council sought to draw a distinction between a 
unique and broad Union competence to manage all aspects of withdrawal, 
and the specificities and limits on Union competence under legal bases of the 
treaties which could be used to negotiate a future relationship between the 
Union and the UK. The difficulty is that a transition period is intended to 
bridge the past and the future. The legal limit, therefore, is that a transition 
cannot be a permanent arrangement without being incompatible with the use 
of Article 50 as a legal basis. Therefore, and notwithstanding the breadth of 
the competence under Article 50, the transition period had to have a 
temporal limitation in order to be lawful. 
This temporal limit had one obvious and profound implication for the 
negotiations, and that concerned the 'backstop'. Had it been possible for the 
EU and the UK to negotiate a parallel track agreement on their future 
relationship, and provided that agreement was consistent with the 
commitments made in the Joint Report, there would be little need for a 
transition period or a 'backstop'. But with negotiations being phased, it 
became clear that the backstop could come into effect following the expiry 
of a time-limited transition period if alternative and subsequent arrangement 
on a future relationship had not entered into force by the expiry of the 
transition period. 
With the backstop proving to be a fundamental political problem for the UK 
in obtaining approval for the Withdrawal Agreement, one means of avoiding 
the backstop being deployed would be to keep all of the UK in transition for 
longer to facilitate the negotiation of alternative arrangements. A more 
'open' transition – with the legal discipline it produced being substituted as 
new agreements entered into force – would have had an obvious appeal were 
it not politically difficult – the spectre of 'Brexit in Name Only' – and legally 
problematic inasmuch as the end of transition would depend on an uncertain 
future event rather than a specific date.35  
 
35 Kenneth A Armstrong, 'Transition Time: 3 Options For Extending The Transition 
Period' (2018) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 61/2018 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3272851> accessed 11 October 2019. 
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Nonetheless, it is worth noting that while a clear end-point was generally 
accepted as a precondition for the lawfulness of a transition period based on 
Article 50, rather different considerations seem to have been applied to the 
duration of the backstop which also has its legal basis in Article 50. It was 
stated by the then UK Prime Minister that 'the treaty is clear the backstop 
can only ever be temporary',36 and in its unilateral Declaration on the Irish 
Protocol, the Government expressed its view that the Withdrawal 
Agreement to which the Protocol is attached 'is based on Article 50 TEU 
[and] does not aim at establishing a permanent future relationship between 
the Union and the United Kingdom'.37 Despite political pressure to have an 
end-point or exit clause written into the backstop, the counter-argument 
that a backstop ceases to fulfil its purpose if it can be exited prevailed. All of 
which might suggest that mutatis mutandis a more open-ended transition 
period – with the application of EU law ceasing to have effect once new 
subsequent agreements came into force – could have been considered as 
being capable of being lawfully based on Article 50 TEU.  
Of course, keeping the whole of the UK in transition for longer, and subject 
to the EU acquis as a means of avoiding triggering the backstop, incurs its own 
political costs. Nonetheless, the more one presses precise temporality as a 
precondition for the lawfulness of transition based on Article 50, the more 
one has to question why the same considerations did not apparently apply to 
the backstop.38 And as we will consider below, the shorter the duration of 
transition, the more likely it would be that the backstop would be deployed. 
 
36 'Prime Minister's Statement on the European Council' (GOV.UK, 17 December 
2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-european-
council-17-december-2018> accessed 11 October 2019. 
37 'Declaration by Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the Northern Ireland Protocol' 
(GOV.UK, 11 March 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/11-
march-withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration-laid-before-parliament-
following-political-agreement> accessed 11 October 2019. 
38 A similar point is made in a 'View from Brussels' briefing by Herbert Smith 
Freehills: 'Using EU law to improve the Brexit deal along the lines requested by the 
UK Parliament' (4 February 2019). Similarly the legal advice offered by the 
Attorney General on the Irish Protocol underscores that the EU had insisted that 
Article 50 could only serve as a legal basis for arrangements that were a 'bridge to a 
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Although the limits on Union competence are a primary aspect of legality 
from an EU perspective, other normative considerations might also 
condition the legality – and duration – of transition. A more open-ended 
transition during which time the UK would continue to be bound by EU rules 
and norms – including new rules adopted during the transition period – but 
without political representation in the Union, could be considered to be 
incompatible not only with the Union's own commitments to respect the 
principle of democracy (Articles 2 and 10 TEU), but also the principle of 
representative democracy enshrined in Article 3, Protocol 1 attached to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. As Peretz argues, it is the 
temporary nature of the transition period which is intended to immunize this 
aspect of the Withdrawal Agreement from legal criticism.39 
VI. THE DURATION OF TRANSITION 
Operating within the temporal requirements for the lawful use of Article 50 
TEU, it would, nonetheless, be possible to specify the duration of transition 
in different ways depending upon the purpose that transition served (see 
Section 2 above). If, for example, the purpose was to facilitate regulatory 
capacity-building in the UK, this could take a rather different amount of time 
from that which might be required, for example, to negotiate a future trade 
agreement with the EU or with non-EU states. If transition also served the 
ends of avoiding triggering the 'backstop', that would suggest a transition 
period at least of the duration of negotiations on alternative arrangements. 
 
more permanent arrangement': Attorney-General, 'Legal effect of the Protocol on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland' (13 November 2018). It is unclear why strict temporality 
is a condition of the legality of a transition period but not of the backstop which 
also has its legal basis in Article 50 TEU. 
39 See George Peretz QC, 'The Brexit Withdrawal Agreement May Violate The 
European Convention on Human Rights', Prospect Magazine (11 October 2018) 
<https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/the-brexit-withdrawal-agreement-
may-violate-the-european-convention-on-human-rights> accessed 11 October 
2019. Peretz notes that this line of argument is augmented in an EU context by the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Matthews v United Kingdom, 
Application No. 24833/94 (1999) 28 EHRR 361 which was concerned with the 
denial of a right to vote in elections to the European Parliament.  
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The UK wanted a flexible and functional transition period of 'around 2 years' 
with the duration determined 'simply by how long it will take to prepare and 
implement the new processes and new systems that will underpin the future 
partnership'.40 However, in its position paper, the Union negotiating team 
defined the duration of transition in precise terms: it would begin on the date 
of entry into force of the Withdrawal Agreement and end on 31 December 
2020.41 This was in line with the revised negotiating directives proposed by 
the Commission and agreed by the Council.42 It is the deadline that is 
contained in Article 126 of the Withdrawal Agreement. 
The political reasons for having a deadline for the end of the transition period 
are apparent on both sides. For the UK, an agreement that kept the UK 
subject to EU rules and contributing to the EU budget without any of the 
benefits of participation in EU decision-making could only ever be a short-
term measure. While the UK originally wanted some flexibility, a more fixed 
endpoint for the transition should have helped the UK Prime Minister to sell 
the negotiated agreement to those who might otherwise be anxious that a 
more open transition would keep the UK in a 'zombie' quasi-EU 
membership. On the other hand, and as explained, it dramatized the 
potential for the Irish backstop to be triggered if no new arrangements were 
in place at the end of a short transition. For the EU side, a time-limited 
transition was consistent with the Union's position on the temporary nature 
of a transition based on Article 50 TEU and was in line with the European 
Council's guidelines. More directly, a transition period ending in 2020 neatly 
coincides with the end of the current Multiannual Financial Framework that 
 
40 HM Government, 'Draft Text for Discussion: Implementation Period' (21 
February 2018): <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/682894/Draft_Text_for_Discussion__Impl
ementation_Period__1_.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019.  
41 Position Paper, 'Transitional Arrangements in the Withdrawal Agreement' TF50 
(2018) 30 (7 February 2018) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/transition.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019. 
42 Council Decision supplementing the Council Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising 
the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland for an agreement setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal 
from the European Union (XT 21004/18). 
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guides the EU budget and so avoids having to include the UK in budgetary 
planning over the next financial period.  
Nonetheless, during the course of the Brexit negotiations, it became 
apparent that the duration of the transition period might need to be 
revisited. Firstly, if a practical purpose of the transition period was to create 
time to negotiate subsequent agreements including on the future 
relationship, then the deadline set in the Withdrawal Agreement seemed 
unrealistic. Expecting negotiations to be conducted and finalised between 
the UK's formal withdrawal from the EU and the end of 2020 seemed 
improbable, and given how long it had taken to negotiate the Withdrawal 
Agreement itself, highly questionable. The ambitious scope of the intended 
negotiations and the need for new agreements to obtain domestic approval 
and ratification prior to their entry into force before the expiry of the 
transition period demands a longer transition.  
Secondly, the lack of realism about what might be achieved in the limited 
time available was exacerbated by domestic political conflict over the terms 
and nature of a future relationship with the EU. Although the EU insisted 
that formal negotiations on a future relationship could not begin until the 
UK had left the EU, had the UK Government forged a domestic consensus 
on what it wanted by way of a future relationship, the Union and the UK 
would have been able to start formal negotiations with a sense of momentum 
and clarity of purpose. By contrast, the UK Prime Minister's attempt to get 
MPs to back the Withdrawal Agreement without approval of the text of the 
Political Declaration suggested that the Government was even prepared to 
countenance a relatively 'blind' Brexit, none of which would facilitate 
expedited post-withdrawal negotiations on the future relationship. 
The third driving force was the continuing difficulty in agreeing the 
'backstop'. If there was a risk that the transition period could end in 2020 
without a new future relationship in place, then the assurances that the UK 
Government gave about the backstop as an 'insurance policy' that need never 
be deployed would simply lack credibility. With domestic political attention 
focusing on whether it would be possible for the UK unilaterally to exit the 
backstop and with the EU unified around a position that the backstop was 
not up for renegotiation, extending the transition period to give more time 
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for negotiations on agreements that would avoid the backstop being 
deployed appeared to be a useful way of helping the UK to sell its Brexit deal. 
Despite good reasons to revisit the 31 December 2020 deadline, any attempt 
to change or extend the transition period still had to confront the political 
and legal limits described previously. Implausibly, the UK Prime Minister 
initially intimated that the UK might seek a facility to extend the transition 
period by only a matter of months. In the end, a new provision was added to 
the draft Withdrawal Agreement to allow the transition period to be 
extended by one or two years. Accordingly, Article 132(1) provides for the 
Joint Committee established under the Agreement to make a 'single 
decision' before 1 July 2020 on whether to extend the transition period for 
one or two years. This capacity to extend in annual increments also requires 
a corresponding budgetary contribution to be made by the UK. 
The thought that transition could extend to 2022, with the UK still bound by 
EU rules and still making contributions to the EU budget more than six years 
after the referendum on EU membership, is no doubt an unhappy one for 
many politicians and voters. The idea that this could be as a result of a 
decision of a 'Joint Committee' may also cause some alarm and it is unclear 
what sort of parliamentary scrutiny would accompany any decision to extend 
transition. Yet, before the transition period can be extended it has to come 
into being upon the entry into force of the Withdrawal Agreement. With the 
UK House of Commons unable to give statutory approval for the texts of the 
Agreement and the Political Declaration, attention has focused instead on a 
different type of extension, namely extension of the UK's membership of the 
Union. It is to this extension that attention turns because it has profound 
implications not just for the duration of transition, but whether any 
transition period takes place at all.  
VII. EXTENDING EU MEMBERSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
TRANSITION 
Article 50(3) TEU permits the Union, following notification of an intention 
to withdraw and in agreement with the withdrawing state, to extend the two-
year period after which the treaties would otherwise cease to apply to the 
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withdrawing state.43 The effect of such a decision – to be taken by the 
European Council with the unanimous agreement of the Member States – is 
to extend the withdrawing Member State's membership of the Union. 
Following failed attempts to gain parliamentary approval for the texts of the 
Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, on 20 March 2019 the 
then UK Prime Minister formally requested an extension till the end of June 
2019.44 The Union, however, was only prepared to offer an extension till 22 
May on the condition of approval by MPs of the deal negotiated with the 
Union before 29 March or, in the absence of such approval till 12 April.45 
Despite severing the text of the Political Declaration and only seeking 
approval of the Withdrawal Agreement,46 MPs once again failed to approve 
the Agreement leaving the Prime Minister to once again seek an extension.47 
Her request for an extension again to the end of June – but with a hope that 
it might end sooner and so avoid the need to hold elections in the UK to the 
European Parliament on 23 May – was countered by the EU who – despite 
clear reservations from France about the shadow that Brexit would cast over 
the EP elections – would only agree a longer extension to the end of October 
2019.48 
Extending the Article 50 withdrawal process has very significant implications 
for a transition period. First, if an extension of the Article 50 process results 
 
43 See Fabbrini and Schmidt in this issue. 
44 'Prime Minister's Letter to President of the European Council' (GOV.UK, 20 
March 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-
letter-to-president-tusk-20-march-2019> accessed 11 October 2019. 
45 European Council Decision (EU) 2019/476 taken in agreement with the United 
Kingdom of 22 March 2019 extending the period under Article 50(3) TEU: [2019] 
OJ L80I/1. 
46 This tactic was compatible with EU law in that Article 50 TEU is fundamentally 
concerned with the negotiation of a withdrawal agreement, but would not have 
constituted a formal statutory approval in terms of section 13 of the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 which demands that both texts be approved. 
47 'Prime Minister's Letter to Donald Tusk' (GOV.UK, 5 April 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-
president-tusk-5-april-2019> accessed 11 October 2019.  
48 European Council Decision (EU) 2019/584 taken in agreement with the United 
Kingdom of 22 March 2019 extending the period under Article 50(3) TEU: [2019] 
OJ L101/1. 
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in a Withdrawal Agreement entering into force, the period of such an 
extension also reduces the duration of a transition period as the end point of 
the transition period is fixed in the Withdrawal Agreement. In other words, 
the longer the extension the less time is available for negotiations on a future 
relationship. The extension to 31 October 2019 reduced the transition period 
by seven months, making the likelihood of the Joint Committee extending 
transition a near certainty. 
Second, while a transition period following a short extension is manageable, 
the longer the extension, the more that the purpose of any transition would 
come into question. Instead it might be better simply to continue to extend 
the UK's EU membership and focus on negotiating the new future 
relationship between the Union and the UK. Quite obviously, such an 
approach would run counter to everything the EU had said about not 
undertaking negotiations on the future until the UK left the Union. It would 
undermine the strategy of the phased and sequential negotiations before and 
after withdrawal. And it would conflict with the new UK Prime Minister's 
stated intention for the UK to leave the EU by 31 October 2019. But at a 
pragmatic level – and perhaps also as a way of avoiding having to trigger the 
backstop at the expiry of a shortened transition – it might be less disruptive 
to seek to negotiate a package of agreements concerning not just withdrawal 
from the Union but also the future relationship. 
Thirdly, the failure to leave the Union and the grant of a further extension 
played into domestic politics in a profound way. Instead of using the period 
of the extension to conduct another 'meaningful vote' on the Brexit deal, 
Theresa May changed tack and announced her intention to bring forward the 
European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill – which would give domestic 
legal effect to a Withdrawal Agreement – complete with new safeguards to 
try to appeal to MPs. However, the strength of opposition she encountered 
led to her resignation. Confronting the choice between seeking a further 
extension to membership to negotiate an orderly departure or winning back 
voters who had deserted the Conservatives for the Brexit Party, Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson's political mantra has been to 'Get Brexit Done' and 
to secure that the UK leaves the EU by 31 October 2019, with or without a 
Withdrawal Agreement. 
 




Looking back at the negotiations that led to the Withdrawal Agreement, the 
need for a transition period was a logical consequence of the phasing of 
negotiations in terms of the management of the UK's exit from the Union 
and the agreement of the terms of a new relationship. In this way, the purpose 
behind a transition period was to give the parties a safety net against a cliff-
edge departure and a bridge to a future relationship. Legal certainty and the 
continuity of economic and social relationships would be preserved through 
a 'stand-still' transition. 
However, this aspiration for legal certainty and continuity has been 
undermined by the contested politics of Brexit which has inhibited the 
intended entry into force of a Withdrawal Agreement and the 
commencement of the transition period. For some, the anxiety relates to the 
absence of a consensus as to the ultimate endpoint of Brexit in the sense of a 
lack of clarity as to the terms of a future relationship that is not expressed in 
a legally binding Withdrawal Agreement but instead a framework Political 
Declaration. Yet while some have concerns about a 'Blind Brexit' a more 
fundamental concern, particularly within the ruling Conservative Party, is 
that transition is neither a safety net nor a bridge but a legal trap that keeps 
the UK too closely aligned to the EU ('Brexit in name only'). If a No Deal 
Brexit is to be avoided, these concerns will need to be overcome. 
On reflection, the smooth and orderly exit of a Member State as anticipated 
by the legal language of Article 50 simply fails to comprehend that the sort of 
politics that initiates a withdrawal from the EU will also struggle to handle it. 
In a country like the UK with a political constitution, a political crisis is also 
a potential constitutional crisis, further exacerbating its capacities for 
political will-formation either to end the Brexit process or to continue 
towards post-membership with or without a Brexit deal. The decision by 
Prime Minister Johnson to suspend Parliament in the run up to 'Exit Day' – 
a decision successfully challenged in litigation in the courts of Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and England – dramatises the strained relationship 
between the Executive and Parliament and between law and politics that 
Brexit has produced. 
One way or another, the UK will be in transition.
